1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT								
2	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA								
3	WESTERN DIVISION								
4	HONORABLE MANUEL L. REAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING								
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7	SECURITY AND EXCHANGE) COMMISSION,) CERTIFIED COPY								
8	PLAINTIFF,)								
9) CV 11-1309 R VS.								
10	MICHAEL W. PERRY, et al.,)								
11	DEFENDANTS.)								
12)								
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15	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS								
16	MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2012 A.M. SESSION								
17	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA								
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21	SHERI S. KLEEGER, CSR 10340								
22	FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 312 NORTH SPRING STREET, ROOM 402								
23	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012 PH: (213)894-6604								
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2	APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:								
3	ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF:								
4	DONALD SEARLES, ESQUIRE NICHOLAS CHUNG, ESQUIRE								
5	JOHN BERRY, ESQUIRE								
6	ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT: D. JEAN VETA, ATTORNEY AT LAW								
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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA; MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2012
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                           A.M. SESSION
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                THE CLERK: Calling Item No. 3, CV-11-1309:
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    SEC versus Michael W. Perry, et al.
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                Counsel, please state your appearances.
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                MR. SEARLES: Good morning, Your Honor.
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    Donald Searles, John Berry and Nicholas Chung on behalf
    of the Commission.
12
13
                MS. VETA: Good morning, Your Honor. Jean
14
    Veta on behalf of defendant Michael Perry.
15
                Mr. Perry is in the courtroom with me today,
16
    sir.
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                THE COURT: All right. Counsel, anything to
    add to the documents with have been filed?
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19
                MR. SEARLES: No, Your Honor.
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                MS. VETA: No, Your Honor.
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                THE COURT: All right. Defendant moves for
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    summary judgment on the SEC's risk-weighting and
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    17(a)(2) claims.
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                Concerning the risk-weighting claim, between
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    June 20, 2000 and May 12, 2008, the Office of Thrift
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Supervision required IndyMac to double risk weight its prime assets when calculating whether the bank was well capitalized.

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Defendant contends that on February 26, 2008, the OTS director waived the double risk-weighting requirement, though the director does not recall doing so.

IndyMac utilized the waiver in its 2008

Form 10-Q contained an accurate table comparing the bank's non-double risk weighted capital ratio as of March 31, 2008, when the non-double risk weight ratios for prior quarters. However, it did not disclose the OTS's waiver or that the bank had transitioned away from double risk-weighting prime assets -- subprime assets. The bank did not qualify as a well capitalized without the OTS waiver.

The SEC contends there was no OTS waiver, and even if there was, failing to disclose the waiver and that the bank had transitioned away from double risk-weighting subprime assets were material omissions.

Defendant contends it is entitled to summary judgment on the SEC's risk-weighting claim because as reported, it was well capitalized under the operative capital ratio, and it was not required to disclose the OTS waiver or that it had transitioned away from double

risk-weighting subprime assets.

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First, there is no genuine issue of material fact that IndyMac received a waiver.

Defendant provided evidence indicative of the waiver such as Mr. Key's recollection of the waiver and follow-up communications relaying the waiver.

While OTS director does not recall granting the waiver, a witness' lack of recollection does not create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Federal Election Commission versus Toledano,
12 317 F.3d 939 (Ninth Circuit 2002).

Second, failing to disclose the waiver and that the bank had transitioned away from double risk-weighting subprime assets were not material omissions.

To fulfill the materiality requirement, there must be substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted facts would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information made available.

22 Basic, Inc. versus Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 23 (1988).

The bank provided accurate charts that showed it was well capitalized under the operative

capital ratio. A capitalized status under a hypothetical inapplicable capital ratio does not alter this information in any way.

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Moreover, the bank is not required to disclose hypothetical information. See Hanon versus Dataproducts Corporation, 976 F.2nd (Ninth Circuit 1992). Therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the risk waiting claim is hereby granted.

Concerning the SEC's Section 17(a)(2) claims, Section 17(a)(2) states that it shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact. 15 U.S.C. Section 77(a)2).

Defendant seeks summary judgment with respect to both the risk-weighting and capital contribution issues on the ground that he did not obtain any money or property after the alleged material misrepresentation.

The SEC contends IndyMac obtained money through the offer or sale of securities through its use of the direct stock purchase plan.

However, those sales ended on May 9, 2008, prior to the May 12, 2008, securities filings, and IndyMac did not raise additional capital after that

1 time. 2 IndyMac's direct stock purchase plan administrator, Mellon Bank, received money from bidders 3 on shares, but the money was refunded after the minimum 4 threshold trading price was not met. 5 The SEC has not alleged a separate basis for 6 7 Mr. Perry himself having obtained money or property. 8 Defendant's status as a salaried employee and shareholder without more is insufficient, because he did 10 not sell any stock during the relevant period and his 11 compensation was not earned as a result of the fraud. 12 SEC versus Hopper, 2006 U.S. District LEXIS 13 17772, (Southern District of Texas, March 24, 2006). Therefore, defendant's motion for partial 14 15 summary judgment as to the Section 17(a)(2) claims is hereby granted. 16 17 Counsel to prepare the order, to prepare the 18 non-controverted facts and the judgement. 19 MS. VETA: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 MR. SEARLES: Your Honor, will you be setting a trial date in this matter? It was vacated the 21 22 last time we were before you. 23 THE COURT: We probably will be. I will

All right. We will be in recess.

have to look at my calendar.

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1	MR.	SEARLES:	Thank you,	Your	Honor.	
2	(PR	OCEEDINGS	CONCLUDED.)			
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                CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
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    COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
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                             ) SS
6
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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    I, SHERI S. KLEEGER, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER, IN AND FOR
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    THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL
    DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT PURSUANT
10
11
    TO SECTION 753, TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, THE
12
    FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF THE
    STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED PROCEEDINGS HELD IN THE
13
14
   ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER AND THAT THE TRANSCRIPT PAGE
15
   FORMAT IS IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS OF THE
16
    JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES.
17
   DATE: FEBRUARY 9, 2010
18
19
    /s/____
20
21
    SHERI S. KLEEGER, CSR
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    FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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